# 1AC

## Framework

#### I affirm. ‘Ought’ implies obligation so I value morality.

"Ought." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 16 Dec. 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>. “used to express obligation”

#### Egoism is *always wrong* and is wrong under *any* moral framework:

#### (a) It’s wrong under util, deont, intuitions, and the most common moral theories. Shaver:

Shaver, Robert, [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada. His area of specialisation is: Ethics, Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy] “Egoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/egoism/>. SHSLW

One issue concerns how much ethical **egoism differs** in content **from standard moral theories**. It might appear that it differs a great deal. After all, moral theories **such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality require that an agent give weight to** the interests of **others. They sometimes require** uncompensated **sacrifices**, particularly when the loss to the agent is small and the gain to others is large. (Say the cost to me of saving a drowning person is getting my shirtsleeve wet.) Ethical **egoists** can **reply**, however, **that** egoism generates many of the same duties to others. The argument runs as follows. **Each person needs the cooperation of others to obtain goods** such as defense or friendship. If I act as if I give no weight to others, others will not cooperate with me. If, say, I break my promises whenever it is in my direct self-interest to do so, others will not accept my promises, and may even attack me. I do best, then, by acting as if others have weight (provided they act as if I have weight in return). It is unlikely that this argument proves that ethical egoism generates all of the standard duties to others. For the argument depends on the ability of others to cooperate with me or attack me should I fail to cooperate. **In dealings with others who lack these abilities, the egoist has no reason to cooperate**. The duties to others found in standard moral theories are not conditional in this way. I do not, for example, escape a duty to save a drowning person, when I can easily do so, just because the drowning person (or anyone watching) happens never to be able to offer fruitful cooperation or retaliation. **The divergence between ethical egoism and standard moral theories appears in other ways**. First, **the** ethical **egoist will rank as most important duties that bring her the highest payoff. Standard moral theories determine importance** at least in part **by considering the payoff to those helped**. What brings the highest payoff to me is not necessarily what brings the highest payoff to those helped. I might, for example, profit more from helping the local Opera society refurbish its hall than I would from giving to famine relief in Africa, but standard moral theories would rank famine relief as more important than Opera hall improvements. Second, **the cooperation argument cannot be extended to justify extremely large sacrifices, such as the soldier falling on the grenade, that standard moral theories rank either as most important or supererogatory**. The cooperation argument depends on a short-term loss (such as keeping a promise that it is inconvenient to keep) being recompensed by a long-term gain (such as being trusted in future promises). Where the immediate loss is one's life (or irreplaceable features such as one's sight), there is no long-term gain, and so no egoist argument for the sacrifice.

#### (b) It’s contradictory, and trying to resolve egoism’s contradiction just creates another, so it’s self-defeating and negates its own value. Shaver 2:

Shaver, Robert, [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada. His area of specialisation is: Ethics, Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy] “Egoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/egoism/>. SHSLW

G. E. Moore argued that ethical **egoism is** self-**contradictory. If I am an egoist, I hold that I ought to maximize my good. I deny that others ought to maximize my good (they should maximize their own goods). But to say that x is “my good” is just to say that my possessing x is good**. (I cannot possess the goodness.) **If my possession of x is good, then I must hold that others ought to maximize my possession of it. I both deny and am committed to affirming that others ought to maximize my good. (Sometimes Moore suggests instead that “my good” be glossed as “x is good and x is mine**.” This does not yield the contradiction above, since it does not claim that my possession of x is good. **But it yields a different contradiction: if x is good, everyone ought to maximize it wherever it appears; egoists hold that I ought to maximize x only when it appears in me**.)

#### (c) Egoism can’t guide action, which is morality’s purpose – it recommends impossible states of affairs. Shaver 3:

Shaver, Robert, [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada. His area of specialisation is: Ethics, Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy] “Egoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/egoism/>. SHSBR

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Broad rightly noted that this does not show that egoism is self-contradictory, since it is not part of egoism to hold that what is good ought to be pursued by everyone (Broad 1942). But that reply does not defend egoism from the charge of falsity. To do so, one might understand “my good” not as composed from what Moore calls “good absolutely,” but as being a sui generis concept, good-for-me (Mackie 1976, Smith 2003), or as analyzed in terms of what I, from my point of view, ought to desire. In neither of these cases does it follow from “my possession of x is good-for-me” that others ought to maximize what is good-for-me. One might even argue that claims about “good absolutely” do not justify claims about what one ought to do, without in addition there being a special relation between the agent and the proposed change. If so, it does not follow simply from my possession of x being good that others ought to do anything (Prichard 2002 217). Moore also suggests that the reason for me to pursue my good is the goodness of the thing I obtain. If what I obtain is good, then there is reason for everyone to pursue it, not just in me, but anywhere. Again, moving to good-for-me avoids this consequence. But something close to this argument is plausible, especially for some bad things. One might argue that it is the way my pain feels — its badness — and not any connection between me and the pain that gives me reason to alleviate it. If so, I have reason to alleviate the pain of others (Nagel 1986, Rachels 2002). (This argument can be directed against rational egoism as well.) A second argument against ethical egoism was made by H. A. Prichard. He argues that self-interest is the wrong sort of reason. I do not, for example, think the reason I have a duty to help a drowning child is that helping benefits me (Prichard 2002 1, 9, 26, 29, 30, 122, 123, 171, 188). Similarly, Prichard chastises Sidgwick for taking seriously the view that there is “a duty...to do those acts which we think will lead to our happiness” (Prichard 2002 135). This is convincing when “duty” means “moral duty.” It is less convincing when, as Prichard also thinks, the issue is simply what one ought to do. He takes there to be only one sense of “ought,” which he treats as “morally ought.” Any other “ought” is treated as really making the non-normative claim that a certain means is efficient for attaining a certain end. But ethical egoism can be seen as making categorical ought-claims. And the historical popularity of ethical egoism, which Prichard so often notes, indicates that self-interest is not obviously irrelevant to what one ought to do (in a not specifically moral sense). One might also object to Prichard-style arguments that (a) they are question-begging, since egoists will hardly agree that my reason for helping is something other than the benefit to me, and (b) given disagreement over this claim about my reason, the appropriate response is to suspend judgment about it. Alison Hills, in 2010 parts II and III (directed at rational egoism), replies to (a) that moralists can assure themselves by giving arguments that start from premises like “I have a reason to help regardless of whether doing so contributes to my self-interest,” provided this premiss is not inferred from the falsity of rational egoism — perhaps it is self-evident. In reply to (b), she argues that disagreement over the premiss does not require moralists to suspend judgment about it, although disagreement over an egoistic premiss like “I have reason to help only because doing so benefits me” does require egoists to suspend judgment. The difference is that rational egoists aim at knowledge, and for putative knowledge, in cases of disagreement between epistemic peers, suspension of belief is required. Moralists aim primarily not at knowledge but at the ability to draw, on their own, true moral conclusions from the evidence. Since aiming at this ability requires not giving weight to the conclusions of others, suspension of belief in cases of disagreement is not required of them. Obviously, much here depends on the claim about the aim of moralists. One might object that moralists care much more about getting true moral conclusions than about arriving at them on their own. If I could guarantee that I do the right act by relying on a Moral Answers Machine (and not otherwise), I ought to do so. In addition, since moralists do want true moral conclusions, and peer disagreement is relevant to pursuing truth, Hills' moralists both need and cannot (by one means) pursue truth. A third argument, like Moore's, claims that ethical egoism is inconsistent in various ways. **Say** ethical **egoism recommends that A and B both go to a certain hockey game**, since going to the game is in the self-interest of each. Unfortunately, **only one seat remains**. Ethical **egoism**, then, **recommends an impossible state of affairs**. Or **say that I am A and an** ethical **egoist. I both claim that B ought to go to the game, since that is in her self-interest, and I do not want B to go to the game, since B's going to the game is against my self-interest**.

#### (d) Epistemology and Ontology – The only way to know identity and the world is to engage with that which you are not. Wood 2k6:

Allen Wood writes in 2006 Fichte’s Intersubjective I. (Stanford University, USA) Inquiry, Volume 49, Number 1 (February, 2006) http://www.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/FichteIntersubjective.pdf

There the transcendental ordering of thoughts begins with the I’s self-positing (or as he also calls it, “self-reverting” activity) and argues that forming a concept of this activity requires distinguishing it from an opposed activity, that of the object or “not-I”. We first acquire our concept of the I as an acting being through the concept of its interaction with the not-I (the material world). The I as an acting thing, therefore, must also be material, a body. The body is not an empirical accompaniment but a transcendentally deduced requirement for being an active I at all: “Experience could not teach us that we have a body. That we have a body and that it is ours is something we have to know in advance, as a condition for the possibility of experience”. A disembodied Cartesian thinking substance therefore incoherent, a transcendental impossibility. “Apart from connection with a body (an I) would not be a person, but would be something quite inconceivable (if one can still refer to a thing which is not even conceivable as ‘something’)” An active I “finds itself” (to use a favorite expression of Fichte in this connection) only as *willing* and its willing takes the form of a striving against a material world on which it acts, and to which it is at the same time also passive. At a general, indeterminate (and also unconscious) level, this willing is already present at every point at which the I finds itself, in the form of an indeterminate striving. But the I’s awareness of itself as active is also an awareness of its activity as the determinate activity of this I. And it is at this still very fundamental point in the transcendental deduction of the conditions for the possibility of being an I that Fichte regards it as necessary to form the concept of other I’s besides one’s own, and to expect to encounter them in experience. For it is only through the experience of a certain kind of object, which is essentially distinguished from all *merely* material objects, that the self-consciousness of the I as a determinate form of activity can be thought of as possible at all.

#### **That also means egoism collapses because you cannot act for you self-interests without an understanding of your own being, but you must selflessly engage with that which you are not to discover your own being.**

#### **(e) Value Double-Bind – either saying that egoism is good is just good for the person saying it, in which case it’s circular and an appeal to itself, or egoism can be good independent of a specific agent, at which point things can be good for all and not just the self, so egoism would be wrong.**

#### (f) Scope – egoism could never be normative because it would be against one’s self interest to tell others to be egoists, because if they aren’t egoists then they do not compete, but that would mean egoism could never apply to multiple people at a time, at which point it could never judge a phenomenon applying to multiple people simultaneously.

#### (g) Context – acting for the self for the sake of the self at worst does not beg the question of ethics – I do not consider morality when it’s time to brush my teeth because I am me. Moral concerns are only pertinent between people, so egoism does not generate moral reasons to do something.

#### (h) Foresight Function – one can never capitulate to egoism reliably because that requires prior knowledge about whether something will result in something good for them, which is epistemically inaccessible. Dorsey:

Dale Dorsey, "Consequentialism, Metaphysical Realism and the Argument from Cluelessness,” Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246): 48-70 (2012). SM

**First**, virtually **anything we do**, as Lenman notes, **is likely to have consequences that** are identity-affecting, **alter**ing facts about **who exists or will exist**.7 **But** the **consequences** of identity affecting actions, or most of them anyway, **are invisible**. As an illustration, Lenman considers the act of “Richard,” an early German conquerer, in sparing “Angie”—whose far distant ancestor turned out to be Adolf Hitler: The decision to spare Angie is an event with massive causal ramiﬁcations. It is highly plausible that almost **all killings** and engenderings **and refrainings** from these **have** similarly **massive causal ramiﬁcations**.These actions ramify in massive ways most obviously because they are, let us say, ‘identity-affecting’. These are **actions** that **make a difference to the identities of future persons and these differences** are apt to **amplify** exponentially **down** the **generations**.A very high proportion of identity-affecting actions are, it is enormously plausible, reliably subject to such massive causal ramiﬁcation.8 **Given that any particular action**—especially actions that are in some way or other identity-affecting—**will have massive causal ramiﬁcations, we** surely **have no good evidence** in the ex ante or ex post **about the axiological quality of** the **consequences** of our actions. That Richard’s sparing of Angie eventually resulted in the holocaust is certainly unknowable to Richard, Angie, or, indeed, anyone else. **Second,** some of the **consequences** of our actions **are** the result of that action playing a role in a causal system that is **extremely sensitive to small changes**. Lenman writes: “Indeed, it is arguably a very real possibility that very many actions that seem very insigniﬁcant are subject to massive causal ramiﬁcation. For some causal systems are known to be extremely sensitive to very small and localized variations or changes **in their initial conditions**.”9 Lenman cites the weather and ﬁnancial markets, systems that can alter signiﬁcantly with very small perturbations.These consequences are barred to even the most epistemically responsible agent. Hence a gigantic proportion of the consequences of our actions are invisible, and **hence the moral valence of our actions is invisible** as well. Furthermore, it would appear that this argument could go further. It needn’t be the case that any particular action actually had massive, unknowable causal ramiﬁcations for the moral valence of that action to be unknowable. **Because** we know that **any action can have such causal ramiﬁcation, we are unjustiﬁed in maintaining** any **conﬁdence** that the visible consequences of any particular action are the only **consequences** (even if, in fact, they are). Hence the argument from cluelessness seems to show, quite powerfully, that **the moral valence of an**y **action is** simply **unknowable**, beyond our epistemic access. As Lenman writes: “The worry is not that our certainty is imperfect, but that we do not have a clue about the overall consequences of many of our actions. Or rather—for let us be precise—a clue is precisely what we do have, but it is a clue of bewildering insigniﬁcance bordering on uselessness—like a detective’s discovery of a fragment of evidence pointing inconclusively to the murderer’s having been seven feet tall. We may not be strictly without a clue, but we are virtually without a clue.

#### All of this means that egoism outweighs on ethical certainty because we will always be uncertain about which moral theory is true and whether their framework is correct, but we can always say with certainty that egoism is wrong, meaning you evaluate egoism first because you can be certain that preventing egoism is good more often than you can be certain that any other framework is true.

#### Prefer impacts that cohere with the most theories. It increases probability of truth. Murphy:

Murphy, Peter (University of Indianapolis). Coherentism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. October 15, 2006. http://www.iep.utm.edu/coherent/

For Sufficiency: The Argument from Increased Probability. In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, C.I. Lewis (1883-1964) introduced a case that has been widely discussed. **A number of witnesses report the same thing about some event** – for example, that Nancy was at last night’s party. **However, the witnesses are unreliable about this sort of thing**. Moreover, **their reports are made** completely **independently** of one another – in other words, the report of any **one witness was in no way influenced by** the report of any of **the other** witnesses. According to Lewis, **the “congruence of the reports establishes a high probability of what they agree upon**.” (p. 246) The point is meant to generalize: **whenever a number of** unreliable **sources operate independently** of one another, **and** they **converge** with the same finding, **this boosts the probability that that finding is correct**. This is so regardless of whether the sources are individual testifiers, various sensory modalities, or any combination of sources. Items that individually are quite unreliable and would not justify belief, when taken together under conditions of independent operation and convergence, produce justified beliefs.

#### Thus the standard is rejecting egoism.

#### It doesn’t matter which ethical theory is true so long as we know egoism would conflict with it. Egoism would justify abandoning any ethical theory when convenient, meaning that egoism is always a meta-level wrong.

## Offense

#### I contend that handgun ownership is egotistical; it prioritizes the self above the other. Horton 2k6:

Horton, David. "Collective Egocentrism Gone Mad." The Huffington Post. N.p., 30 Mar. 2006. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-horton/collective-egocentrism-go\_b\_18214.html>. SHSLW

It is a philosophy that will see the extinction of countless species. It is a philosophy that becomes ingrained in children because we continue to allow adult barbarity like deer and quail and duck and bear shooting, and shark and other big game fishing, and encourage children to take up guns early and copy their parents. **'Shooting** little birds' **instils an attitude that animals and nature are just there at the whim of humans, with** no value of their own, and **no right to existence if a human being decides to point a gun** through a window **and end their life** for no more reason than a moment's thrill. If anything in the environment is expendable on impulse then everything is expendable. **It is an attitude seen towards humans in the horrors of Auschwitz, Bosnia and Ruanda** and Iraq -- the enemy, **the 'other' is sub-human or non-human, and can be destroyed without thought. It is also the attitude that a death penalty instils in a society. America kills thousands of its own citizens each year**, partly **because of the** insane **gun ownership ethos**, partly because of the belief in hunting as a test of manhood, but also because a death penalty sends such a clear message to citizens. **It is okay to take an adult human life if someone decides that it is. Once you allow that state of mind, it isn't just learned judges who have power of life and death but every punk on the street with a cheap pistol or stolen automatic rifle**. The combination of massive **gun ownership** and use, and the apparently contradictory massive professed belief in religion, **have proved disastrous for the** American **environment** in the past. It could be argued that their embodiment in the single person of George Bush symbolises the end of the American environment and eventually of the world environment. **Attitudes to the environment will only change when** religious fundamentalism dies again, and when **humans** also **agree that not only is gun ownership wrong because it causes human deaths, but because it causes the death of animals**.

## Underview

#### 1. Omitted

#### 2. Omitted

#### 3. Omitted

#### 4. Egoism is the root cause of structural violence - greed is why other impacts become established forms of violence. Widdows 2k15:

Widdows, Heather. [John Ferguson Professor of Global Ethics University of Birmingham. Works on Global Ethics, Bioethics, Virtue Ethics and Feminist Theory] “Women and Violence: The Agency of Victims and Perpetrators.” Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Print

What exactly is the attitude on which we need to focus? It cannot be limited just to **malice or greed**, as these **are tied** too **closely to the idea that the actor intended to cause suffering or to make others ‘worse off’, which are** only superficial **features of violence**. The attitude we want must be more general and not tied to these specific forms of violence. Returning again to the problems described with violation accounts, we saw that **our efforts were made problematic as a result of** bias, specifically **self-interested bias**. I want to suggest, then, that **the problematic attitude is** one of **egoism**. This attitude is more prevalent than one might think, and it may even be impossible to be completely selfless. **The impossibility of complete selflessness does not, however, invalidate the view, but implies only that there may be limits to how far we may succeed in ‘solving’** the problem. As Mahatma Gandhi writes, ‘for me nonviolence is not a mere philosophical principle. It is the rule and the breadth of my life. I know I fail often, sometimes consciously, more often unconsciously. It is a matter not of the intellect but of the heart’ (Gandhi 1948). This raises a further point, that **it is not only the malicious and greedy attitudes of murderers and thieves that are of concern, but** the **egoism** that **makes an appearance in all of our lives** that represents the problem. It is important to note that a conception of **violence** as **an attitude** is not wholly distinct from actions. Actions, and their results are, of course, the most salient and confronting aspect of this topic. And **there is an obvious and familiar connection between particular attitudes and the kinds of actions in which they result**. It is crucial, however, to recognize that these familiar connections are not necessary and that an attitude may be expressed in other ways than we are accustomed to. Furthermore, **attitudes can be expressed in individual actions as well as those that are part of institutional arrangements. An attitude-based account will therefore include the** paradigmatic direct and personal acts of violence of traditional definitions as well as so-called ‘**structural violence,’ in which egoistic attitudes are expressed via sociopolitical or economic institutions**.

#### 5. The state is inevitable – refusal to engage it cedes the political to authoritarian elites and abdicates social responsibility – that makes all crises inevitable and turns K alts. Boggs 97:

[Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, “The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America”]

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here – localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, **post-modernism**, Deep Ecology – intersect with and **reinforce** each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a **depoliticized** expression of **struggles to combat** and overcome **alienation. The false sense of empowerment** that comes with such mesmerizing impulses **is accompanied by a loss of public engagement**, an erosion of citizenship **and a depleted capacity** of individuals in large groups **to work for** social **change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying** the fabric of American **society will go unsolved** – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (**ecological crisis**, poverty, urban decay, spread of **infectious diseases**, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and *global* context of internationalized markets**,** finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In the meantime, **the fate of the world hangs in the balance**. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is **the vagaries of political power** that **will continue to decide the fate of** human **societies**.This last point demands further elaboration. **The shrinkage of politics hardly means that** corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social **hierarchies will** somehow **disappear, or that gigantic state** and military **structures will lose their hold** over people’s lives. **Far from it: the space abdicated by** a broad **citizenry**, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, **can** in fact **be filled by authoritarian** and reactionary **elites** – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and **chaos** of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, **could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order** in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for **a *reassertion* of politics in more virulent guise – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure**. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society. 75

#### 6. Working within hegemonic power structures to solve critical issues is key and preferable. Kapoor 2k8:

(Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 138-139)

There are perhaps several other social movement campaigns that could be cited as examples of **a ‘hybridizing strategy’**.5 But what emerges as important from the Chipko and NBA campaigns is the way in which they **treat laws and policies, institutional practices, and ideological apparatuses as deconstructible**. That is, **they refuse to take dominant authority at face value, and** proceed to **reveal its contingencies**. **Sometimes, they expose what the hegemon is trying to disavow or hide** (exclusion of affected communities in project design and implementation, faulty information gathering and dissemination). **Sometimes, they problematize dominant or naturalized truths** (‘development = unlimited economic growth **=** capitalism’, ‘big is better’, ‘technology can save the environment’). In either case, by contesting, publicizing, and politicizing accepted or hidden truths, they hybridize power, challenging its smugness and triumphalism, revealing its impurities. They show power to be, literally and figuratively, a bastard. While speaking truth to power, **a hybridizing strategy also exploits the instabilities of power**. In part, this **involves** showing up and **taking advantage of the equivocations of power — conflicting laws, contradictory policies, unfulfilled promises**. A lot has to do here with **publicly shaming the hegemon, forcing it to remedy injustices and live up to stated commitments in a more accountable** and transparent **manner**. And, in part, **this involves** nurturing or **manipulating the splits and strains within institutions**. Such maneuvering can take the form of cultivating allies, forging alliances, or **throwing doubt on prevailing orthodoxy**. Note, lastly, the way in which **a hybridizing strategy works with the dominant discourse**. This reflects the negotiative aspect of Bhabha’s performativity. **The strategy may outwit the hegemon**, but it does so **from the interstices of the hegemony**. The master may be paralyzed, but his paralysis is induced using his own poison/medicine. It is **for this reason** that **cultivating allies in the adversarial camp is possible: when you speak their language and appeal to their own ethical horizons, you** are **build**ing a modicum of **common ground**. It is **for this reason** also that **the master cannot easily dismiss or crush you. Observing his rules and playing his game makes it difficult for him not to** take you seriously or **grant you a certain legitimacy**. The use of non-violent tactics may be crucial in this regard: state repression is easily justified against violent adversaries, but it is vulnerable to public criticism when used against non-violence. Thus, the fact that Chipko and the NBA deployed civil disobedience — pioneered, it must be pointed out, by the ‘father of the nation’ (i.e. Gandhi) — made it difficult for the state to quash them or deflect their claims.

# Framework Frontlines

Omitted

# Theory Frontlines

## C/I Whole Res Good

#### A – Counter-interp – On the 2016 JanFeb handgun ban topic, the aff must defend the general principle of the resolution.

#### B – I meet – I do.

#### C - Reasons to prefer:

#### 1. Predictability – the whole-res is all we’re always given before the round – a specific plan text could have any number of different solvency advocates that you wouldn’t have answers to – kills neg engagement and by virtue of that probably no-links all of your education arguments.

#### 2. Prep skew – Brentwood has multiple different plans with slight variations in solvency advocates which all require different strategies – exponentially increases the difficulty of the neg to engage. That’s fairness and a unique link to small schools which are more at-risk – I would know.

#### 3. No unique offense because

#### (a) you could just win an ends based framework and prove banning handguns leads to bad ends – either your scenarios and disads are so specific that you’d never get to read them consistently or you’d get to read them anyway, and

#### (b) If you read normal means evidence then that clarifies the general principle of the topic, means you still get access to your staple neg strats

#### 4. Value orientation and aims are specifically a prereq to consequence and action focus on this topic. Kahan 2k3:

Dan M. Kahan. The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 3 (2003), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol60/iss1/2 Ellipses were already in the paragraph from the article.

Gun control fits the same expressive pattern. As one southern Democratic senator recently put it in urging his party to back off the issue, **the** gun **debate is "about values** ... about who you are and who you aren't." 3 **Those who share an egalitarian** and solidaristic world **view, on the one hand, and those who adhere to a more** hierarchical and **individualistic one, on the other, both see the extent of gun regulation as a measure of their** (and their social groups') relative **status** in American society. 4 **What makes the gun control debate so intense is not** a **disagreement about** the **facts-does private ownership of guns promote or deter violent crime?-but** a **disagreement about** "alternative **views of what America** is and **ought to be**."' 5 Of course, to all of this the econometricians might simply demur. Sure, they might say, the gun controversy reflects a conflict in cultural world views. But **they cannot hope to make the two sides agree about the nature of a good society**. They do both profess, however, to agree about the value of protecting innocent persons from harm. So let us continue to focus our attention on the empirical issue-whether more guns produce more crime or less-as our best hope to negotiate a peace between the cultural combatants. The problem with this reasoning, I want to suggest, is that it misconceives the relationship between cultural orientations and beliefs about empirical facts, such as whether gun control reduces or in fact increases crime. **Beliefs about** the **causes and effective responses to societal risks**, I want to argue, **derive from cultural world views**. As a result, **we cannot reach agreement about** the **consequences of gun control unless we have** first come to some **common ground about what values gun laws ought to express**.

#### Implications:

#### (a) turns all of your topic lit arguments – the lit will always be shaped by value orientations which means aims debate is a prerequisite to your standards,

#### (b) turns real world arguments – we can’t engage the real world arguments because they’re all skewed by moral polarization, so general principle comes first,

#### (c) Resolvability – debate under your interp is just who can hyperventilate statistics more successfully which Kahan says can’t be resolved, whereas debate under whole-res comes down to the nuances of the framework debate which we can confidently resolve, resolvability is prior to fairness and education because rounds won’t be decided fairly or educationally if they’re decided poorly

#### 5. Moving Target – affs under your interp each have minutely different policy mechanisms – some involve confiscation, some don’t, some have exceptions, some include manufacturing, etc. That means they’ll always have strange ways of perming your counterplans and solving or no-linking your disads in the 1AR. At least with my aff if you win framework you probably win because I have to defend the general consequences if you win framework. That’s lack of depth of education and in-round fairness skews.

# Substance Frontlines

## Race Root Cause

#### Egoism is tantamount to racism - they’re justified with the same logic. Tan Bhala 2k10:

Dr. Kara Tan Bhala. [PhD (Philosophy) University of Kansas, MA (Philosophy) University of Kansas, MA (Liberal Studies) New York University, MPhil (Management Studies) Oxford University, BS (Systems and Management) City University of London, Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Regulation and Ethics at Queen Mary University of London. "Ethical Egoism." Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics. 10 Sept. 2010. Web. 27 Jan. 2016. <http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/dictionary/ethical-egoism>.

A final and perhaps decisive objection to ethical egoism comes from James **Rachels**. He **equates** ethical **egoism with racism in terms of** its **concept**ual construction. **Racists divide all people into groups and treat people differently based on** the trait of one’s **race but have no justification for concluding that their own** race **is** any **better** than others, **rendering racism** an **arbitrary** doctrine. **Similarly**, ethical **egoists demand that we “divide the world into two categories of people—ourselves and all the rest—and that we regard the interests of those in the first** group **as more important than the interests of** those in **the second group.”6 The egoist can offer no justification for the distinction between the two groups. Hence, Rachels concludes that ethical egoism is an arbitrary doctrine** and that others should be given the same moral consideration as ourselves because their merits and desires are comparable to our own.

## AT: Good Gun Use

#### 1. It’s about the ongoing act of owning a gun, not what people do with it. Owning it is egotistical and that’s most proximal to the resolution.

#### 2. Even if people can use guns to help others, that’s just a coincidental pairing of egoism with altruism and isn’t verifiable.

#### 3. Maybe they just want to make it on the news – self-interest is most probable.

#### 4. My Horton evidence is best – it explains that in the act of shooting preemptively devalues anything but the self, which outweighs because even if it can help others, it devalues them before that.

#### 5. Turn – egotistical actions likely created the bad situation in the first place – people were put in harm’s way for someone else’s sake.

#### 6. This argument appeals to an evaluation of end-states, i.e. it’s good gun use when it saves lives, but that appeals to util which hasn’t been justified and also always-already rejects egoism – that’s Shaver 1.

## XT: Contradictory/States of Affairs

#### Egoism is contradictory and recommends impossible convergence between self-interested actors. Corrigan 2k10:

Corrigan, Richard. (Ph.D. from University College Dublin in 2007. Numerous books, articles and magazine entries on a wide variety of philosophical areas. Specializes in religious philosophy, freedom and control, ethics and metaphysics; Chief Editor of Philosophical Frontiers: A Journal of Emerging Thought and the Managing Director of the Progressive Frontiers Press.) Ethics: A University Guide. Progressive Frontiers Press, 2010. Print. SHSLW

Let us continue to leave PE to one side, for the time being, and look at the RE and EE as independent theses. **A common**ly discussed **problem surrounding** ethical **egoism is whether the egoist can formulate a**n internally consistent **moral theory**. This problem arises for the following reason. **Say that a certain action is morally required — e.g. my taking the last piece of cake on the table will also best promote your self-interest, so that action — you taking the last piece of cake — is also morally required. So you have a moral obligation to take the last piece of cake, but you also lack a moral obligation to take the piece of cake** (or perhaps **have an obligation to refrain from performing this action), as morality requires me to perform this action**. If ethical egoism is presented as an account of universal obligation — an action is morally required if and only if it best promotes an agent’s self-interest — then **it appears to yield contradictory obligations**. However, Rachels argues that this line of argument only works if we suppose that the egoist is committed to the premise that every agent ought not to prevent any other agent from doing her duty. This is not a premise that an ethical egoist would want to accept, however, since whether or not one ought to prevent others from doing their duty depends on whether it is in one’s self-interest to do so. Since the egoist has good reason to reject this premise, it does not seem that there is any logical inconsistency in her position. However, even if there is no logical inconsistency in the ethical’ egoist’s position, many have found the act of egoism yields such contradictory obligations problematic for other reasons. Baier, for example, also argues that since one of the essential functions of morality is conflict resolution, ethical **egoism fails to provide a plausible account of how we ought to act**. Moreover, the ethical egoist’s position is deeply counter-intuitive for other reasons. The ethical egoist holds that an agent is morally required to perform some act if and only if performing that act best promotes his own self-interest. This means that, if staying in bed late this Saturday better promotes my self-interest than keeping my promise to go and help my friend to move house (or performing any other available act-alternative) does, then I will be morally required to stay in bed, since all other available act-alternatives will be morally impermissible. Thus, in such a scenario, the ethical egoist’s account implies that I will not be morally blameworthy if I make a promise to aid a friend, and then don’t keep this promise because of sheer laziness. However, I will be morally blameworthy if I don’t stay in bed, as staying in bed best promotes my self-interest.